Based on trade and quote data from eight exchanges and a trade reporting facility for a sample of LSE-and Euronext-listed equities, this article compares the consolidated liquidity of competing markets, also called global liquidity, and the local liquidity of the primary exchang, before and after MiFID. It then investigates how liquidity measured by spreads and best-quote depth relate to market fragmentation and internalization after MiFID. Market fragmentation is found to improve global and local liquidity, with spreads decreasing proportionally to market competition. The decline in depth observed in the early post-MiFID period is driven by other factors than market fragmentation. The only harmful effect is that fragmentation may reduce market depth for small stocks. Further, internalization is not found to be detrimental for liquidity.
Introduction
Security markets are often considered as natural monopolies because of the so-called virtuous circle of liquidity. Traders choose the market with the best liquidity, and the most liquid market is the one with the most participants because it offers the highest probability of order execution and the most competitive prices (Mendelson, 1987) . As a result of "liquidity begetting liquidity", the market with the greatest number of traders should attract all other traders, so that the order flow should inevitably consolidate in a single market (Pagano, 1989) .
Nevertheless, today, equity trading is anything but consolidated.
There are several reasons why the market for a security may fragment: (1) multiple trading mechanisms exist on the primary exchange for the trading of the security; (2) the security is cross-listed and several exchanges compete for its order flow; (3) alternative trading platforms compete with the primary exchange; or (4) a portion of the order flow is internalized by broker-dealers or executed in the OTC market. With the development of sophisticated trading technologies and the enforcement of pro-competition market regulations, order flow fragmentation of type (3) has undeniably increased in all large western stock markets. More than fifty trading venues now exist in the US, with almost 30% of volume traded off primary exchanges in the first quarter of 2008 according to O'Hara and Ye (2011) . In Europe, market fragmentation is a relatively more recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, more than ten trading venues have become fairly active in liquid European stocks during the past five years.
There is concern among regulators, issuers, and asset managers, about how this may impact the quality of order execution and market liquidity. Whereas competition between trading venues is most often considered as beneficial to the quality of order execution services offered to investors, there is little empirical evidence about the impact of order flow fragmentation on the consolidated liquidity of competing platforms. O'Hara and Ye (2011) have addressed the topic by analyzing the cross-section of 262 US stocks. Their comparison of high and low fragmented stocks shows no harmful effect of fragmentation. Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel (2010) compare the primary market resiliency of Dutch large equities before and after fragmentation became substantial for those securities. They find that the order book of the primary exchange is more resilient in the fragmented period, in that it reverts quicker to its normal level of liquidity after aggressive orders. Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel (2011) allowed by technological innovation may be widely exploited. As a result, MiFID has served as a catalyst for the soaring of competition between marketplaces, and the number of trading 1 This European Union law provides a comprehensive and harmonized regulatory regime for investment services and activities across the 30 member states of the European Economic Area (EEA), i.e. the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. 2 A provision in the 1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD) permitted (but did not mandate) individual member states to require orders from investors in that member state to be executed only on regulated markets. This provision was applied in France, Italy, and Spain. venues at the disposal of investors has rapidly increased for European equities. In that, the implementation of MiFID is a unique event of shifting from consolidated markets to fragmented markets within a relatively short period of time, and this specific event makes it ideal for original research on fragmentation. The present study uses this event to provide empirical evidence on how market liquidity relates to order flow fragmentation. What makes the analysis somehow delicate is the simultaneity of the 2008 financial crisis with the immediate post-MiFID period. The observation periods and the methodology were thus carefully chosen so as to avoid the background effect of the 2008 subprime crisis and its related potential biases. In a second approach, I analyzed the two-way temporal relation between fragmentation and liquidity by a two-stage panel methodology over a later postMiFID and post-crisis period. Results show that (1) spreads and depth have improved with multiple-trading-platforms competition after controlling for endogeneity; (2) fragmentation may nevertheless reduce depth for smaller stocks; (3) OTC and internalized trading has not substantially harmed liquidity; while it may adversely affect quoted spread on the one hand for some groups of stocks, it however favors depth on the other hand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 provides details about the regulatory framework that motivated the study as well as on the organization of the marketplace. Section 4 describes the sample and the data. The fragmentation and liquidity measures used in the empirics are presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides comparative statistics about fragmentation and liquidity before and after MiFID came into force. In Section 7, a two-stage multivariate analysis is conducted to compare the liquidity of the pre-MiFID quasi-consolidated marketplace with that of postMiFID fragmented markets. Section 8 exposes panel analyses of the relation between fragmentation and liquidity in the post-MiFID fragmented markets. Section 9 concludes.
Pros and cons of multi-market trading: A review of the literature
Whether order flow fragmentation adversely affects market quality has already been addressed in numerous research articles. The earliest work usually quoted in this body of literature is that of Hamilton (1979) who studied the effects of off-board trading of NYSElisted stocks on the regional exchanges and in the third market. Hamilton (1979) documents two opposite effects: on the one hand, the dispersion of trading may increase competition and thus improve liquidity (competition effect); on the other hand, it may "prevent full realization of any economies of centralized trading on the exchange" (fragmentation effect).
Benefits of market consolidation and fragmentation effects
Security market centers are often considered as natural monopolies because the marginal cost of a trade decreases with the quantity of orders executed in the market. First, a great part of the costs born to run a market are fixed expenses, so that a consolidated market enjoys economies of scale. If several markets that use the same technology and market model compete together, the one with the highest volume has the lowest average cost, and thereby enjoys a competitive advantage.
Second, there are network externalities associated with running a market. A market becomes more attractive as the number of traders increases. It is easier to find a counterparty in a market where there are more people willing to trade, so that the consolidation of the order flow creates economies of scale on the provision of liquidity (Mendelson, 1987) . Pagano (1989) shows that, when a security trades in two markets with similar structures and types of investors, orders concentrate in the market where traders are foreseen to be more numerous.
Third, under information asymmetry, Chowdry and Nanda (1991) show that adverse selection costs increase with the number of markets listing an asset. Besides, when a new market opens for a stock, it may skim the least informed and consequently more profitable orders, and then harm the liquidity of the primary market (Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara, 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997) . In practice, dealers or market makers are the most able to cream-skim profitable orders, and market fragmentation between competing dealers usually result in larger spreads (for theoretical proofs see the inventory-cost model by Biais (1993) or the information-based model by Madhavan (1995) ). Empirically, Bennett and Wei (2006) provide evidence that stocks switching from a fragmented environment (the old Nasdaq structure) to a more consolidated structure (NYSE) experience an improvement in spreads.
Using European data, Gajewski and Gresse (2007) show that trading costs are smaller in a centralized order book than in a hybrid market equally fragmented between an order book and competing dealers off the order book.
Fourth, another cost of fragmentation is that priority rules are difficult to maintain across markets. In particular, price priority can be violated when large orders in one market trade through prices in another market (see Foucault and Menkveld, 2008; Riordan, Storkenmaier, and Wagener, 2010) .
Benefits of multi-market trading and competition effects
Because of the positive network externality that characterizes markets, trading systems with identical structures have a natural tendency to consolidate, as shown in Pagano (1989) .
Therefore, fragmentation often arises between trading systems that use different mechanisms and thereby addresses the needs of different categories of investors (Harris, 1993) . The ability to serve different clienteles and satisfy diverse trading needs is a benefit of fragmentation (Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000; Gresse, 2006) .
Another positive effect stemming from fragmentation is that monopolistic exchanges may behave noncompetitively and accumulate rents at the expenses of final investors while fragmentation between competing markets often promotes innovation and efficiency. As mentioned by Stoll (2003) , "The term "fragmentation" has a harmful connotation, but, in fact, fragmentation is just another word for competition.". In the 90s, SEAQ International, an Hendershott and Moulton, 2008) .
With competition between market places, spreads often narrow. Battalio (1997) shows that the bid-ask spreads of NYSE-listed securities tightens after a major third market broker-dealer starts operating. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) document that the NYSE entry in the trading of ETFs listed on the American Stock Exchange improves their liquidity. By examining the entries of multiple markets into transacting three major US ETFs, Nguyen, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2007) show that the competition effect dominates the fragmentation effect. Mayhew (2002) and Fontnouvelle, Fishe, and Harris (2003) finds that multi-market trading has the same consequences for the bid-ask spreads of equity options. With respect to European markets, Lee (2002) reviews several empirical studies conducted on the competition between SEAQ International and various continental European exchanges in the 90s. He concludes that most of the measures of market performance show that such competition was beneficial. Competition from new entrants has similar effects. The findings of Huang (2002) suggest that the proliferation of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, has promoted order execution quality rather than fragmenting markets. O'Hara and Ye (2011) 
Sample selection and data
My empirical work consists of two parts: a pre/post-MiFID comparison and a post-MiFID time series analysis. Both parts are based on trade and quote data generously provided by IFS for FTSE-100, CAC-40, and SBF-120 stocks.
Sample selection
In components, and 56 SBF-120-specific components.
Daily data, high frequency data, and data filtering
Daily closing prices, adjustment factors for corporate actions, and market values were collected from Datastream. Prices of UK stocks are expressed in pence sterling. Some metrics used in the study require expressing all prices and volumes in euro. For that purpose, the daily foreign exchange rates of the GBP against EUR were downloaded from the Oanda website (www.oanda.com).
The high-frequency data used in this study were kindly provided by Intelligent Financial Systems (IFS). IFS data were generated from the original data flows of Euronext, the LSE, Deutsche Boerse, Chi-X, Turquoise, Nasdaq OMX Europe, BATS Europe, PLUS, and BOAT. The database includes transaction and best-limit data time-stamped to the second.
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For each stock, the data contain the trade prices and best limit quotes of all trading venues where the stock is priced in the same currency as that of the primary listing. Order flow in other currencies is not considered. All timestamps in the database are in UK time and hours will be expressed in UK time throughout the article.
Best limit data received from IFS provide, at each second of the trading session from 8:00
to 16:30, the best bid price, the best ask price, and quantities associated, for every trading venue where a quote is displayed. The quotes originate from PLUS, Chi-X, BATS Europe, Turquoise, Nasdaq OMX Europe, the Euronext order books, the SETS order book of the LSE, 
Fragmentation and liquidity measures
The order flow in a given security distributes between trading volumes executed on MTFs and RMs, further referred to as the lit order flow, and trading volumes executed by SIs or in the OTC market, further referred to as the internalized order flow. I there present the metrics used to measure both sources of fragmentation and then describe the way traditional measures of liquidity are adapted to measure liquidity in a multi-market environment. 
Measuring order flow fragmentation

Liquidity measures
Liquidity is measured for two categories of traders: local traders who can only connect to the primary exchange, and cross-market traders who are connected to all trading venues or use smart order routers (SORs) that enable them to distribute their orders across several marketplaces. Three metrics of liquidity are considered: quoted spreads, effective spreads, and depth displayed at best quotes. These metrics are determined locally in each primary market in the perspective of local traders and across markets by optimizing the prices of all competing markets.
Global and local quoted spreads
In the data provided by IFS, the quoted spreads of each market are observable at every second. The spread observed on the primary market will be referred to as the local spread.
Each second, the highest bid price and the lowest ask price across all competing markets are determined. The difference between these two prices divided by their mid value is the quoted spread resulting from matching quotes on all markets. It will be referred to as the global (or 
Global and local effective spreads
The effective spread is a proxy for the implicit cost of a given transaction. It corresponds to the difference between the transaction price and the mid quote prevailing at the time of the transaction, measured as a percentage of this median price. It is doubled to make it comparable with the quoted spread. The mid quote used as the baseline is a cross-market consolidated mid quote, i.e. the mid-point of the best bid and ask prices, all markets combined.
Effective spreads are averaged in the same way as quoted spreads, except that they are weighted by transaction size. The transaction universe used to calculate these averages is reduced to trades executed on-book in the continuous session. OTC, internalized and off-book transactions are excluded. Local effective spreads are obtained by averaging the effective spreads of the transactions executed on a given primary exchange, while global effective spreads are obtained by averaging the spreads of the trades from all markets.
Global and local depth at best limits
Best-limit depth is the sum of the quantities associated with the best bid and ask prices. It can be understood as the quantity of shares that can be instantaneously traded with no impact on quoted prices. To ensure that depth is comparable between stocks regardless of price level, it is expressed in terms of capital, specifically in thousands of euros, by multiplying quantities by the mid price. Local depth is computed in the traditional way by considering the bid and offer quantities of the primary exchange. Global depth (also denominated consolidated depth)
is determined by aggregating the quantities demanded at the best bid limit on all markets quoting the best bid price and the quantities offered at the best ask limit on all markets quoting the best ask price. Average depths are then calculated using the same procedure as for average quoted spreads.
Shifting from monopolistic-market trading to multi-market trading and contemporaneous changes in liquidity
Part A of Table 3 constituents, but did not exceed 18% for the smaller stocks of the SBF 120. Table 4 about here 8 The accuracy of these figures is a matter of discussion in several respects. First, the share of internalization is very unstable over time. Second, BOAT and LSE's reporting service do not account for all OTC and internalized volumes. However, it may be claimed that BOAT is the market leader in post-trade reporting and that the estimate may be considered to be in the right order of magnitude. Third, it is well acknowledged that internalized volumes may be subject to double or triple reporting, and may sometimes overlap lit volume statistics. An article by Jacquillat and Gresse (1998) dedicated to the competition between the electronic order book of the Paris Stock Exchange and the SEAQI dealer market, showed that dealer-reported volumes could be inflated by a factor 2 or 3.
In According to these figures, the SETS system has not really lost market share, but the off-book order flow seems to have diminished as the competition from other trading venues has gained ground.
Changes in liquidity: Univariate tests
Global spreads and the local spreads of primary markets, reported in Table 5 
where im L is alternatively the average global quoted spread ( Table 7 reports the results for the regressions of local liquidity. These regressions produce the same findings with the difference that the coefficients of the monthly dummies have a slightly lower significance.
The two-stage regression approach
In a second approach I tested the relation between the level of fragmentation and liquidity measures with a two-stage regression model that accounted for the co-determination between fragmentation and liquidity. The observation periods were restricted to the three post-MiFID months. As widely discussed by O'Hara and Ye (2011), "An immediate challenge to testing for fragmentation effects on market quality are endogeneity issues". When testing the impact of market fragmentation on liquidity, endogeneity may arise at several levels: (1) at the firm level, if for example, the trading in large stocks is more fragmented, finding greater liquidity for more fragmented stocks could simply be the outcome of large stocks being more liquid;
(2) at the order level, the choice of routing an order to a given venue or of splitting it between platforms is endogenous to the relative level of liquidity at each trading venue; (3) at the market level, liquidity and fragmentation may be co-determined, with not only fragmentation impacting liquidity but also liquidity determining fragmentation. At the first stage, the fragmentation index of the lit order flow for a given stock i in a given month m, im FI , 9 is modeled in the following way: Table 8 .
Table 8 about here
All in all, liquidity has improved with fragmentation. Global and local spreads are all negatively related to fragmentation with greater significance for FTSE-100 securities. The only exception is the absence of statistical significance for the negative coefficient of SBF-120 local quoted spreads. The economic impact is relatively low but greater for FTSE-100 stocks than for CAC-40 stocks. Global and local depths are also positively impacted by fragmentation for all indices except the group of SBF-120 mid caps for which depth is not significantly affected.
The effect of internalization is more mitigated and insignificant in most cases. According to pooled-sample regressions, global and local spreads narrowed with the share of internalization, whereas global and local depths were adversely affected by internalization.
However, those findings fail to be significant in by-index regressions, except for the global depth of SBF-120 securities which was negatively affected at the 10% level.
A time series analysis of the relation between order flow fragmentation and liquidity
While Sections 6 and 7 compare market liquidity in two different trading environment and regulatory regimes, this section focuses on how liquidity relates to fragmentation in a multi- constituents, and 56 SBF-120 specific constituents, selected according to the sampling procedure described at Section 4.
One-stage panel regressions
I started this time-series analysis by running, as a first approach, simple two-fixed-effects panel regressions of liquidity measures onto fragmentation and internalization with the following design: (CAC 40 and SBF 120) . This adverse effect has a high statistical significance but a low economic magnitude. Fragmentation most positively affected the liquidity of LSE-listed equities, for which it has improved liquidity without harming any dimension of local liquidity.
More strikingly, findings for SBF-120 mid caps are in stark contrast: no measure of liquidity was significantly correlated with fragmentation for those stocks; on the contrary, their quoted spreads increased and their local depth was reduced with fragmentation. As for internalization, no harmful effect was identified either over the pooled sample or over any index subsample. It was even found to positively affect the depth of LSE equities and the quoted spreads of Euronext equities both at the primary-exchange and global levels.
Two-stage panel regressions
As discussed in Section 7, the estimates of the previous panel regressions may be subject to 
V it denotes volume as previously defined. MV i equals the market capitalization of stock i on the first day of the observation period. MC it is the level of competition between markets, measured by the average number of markets quoting the best bid and ask prices divided by the average number of markets with quotes. This variable is computed in the same way as in and it w are residual terms. Regressions (5) and (6) were OLS-estimated by stock index and included one lag of the dependent variable to correct auto-correlation. Table 9 for the pooled sample and in the right half of Table 10 for subsamples by index. They show greater benefits from fragmentation than those assessed by the one-stage method. All global and local liquidity measures are positively impacted with greater statistical and economic significance than predicted by the one-stage procedure. The only adverse effect is a reduction in the global and local depths of SBF-120 mid caps.
The two-step procedure confirmed the positive impact of internalization on depth with a much greater economic magnitude. Whereas this effect was only significant for the FTSE-100 sample with the one-step test, it has also become highly significant for the mid-cap sample with the two-step test. Nonetheless, the two-stage approach revealed that internalization could be harmful for quoted spreads: the coefficients of the internalization variable are significantly positive in the regressions of global and local spreads for the pooled, the FTSE-100, and the French mid-cap samples, with greater values in the case of local spreads.
GMM dynamic panel regressions
As a robustness check, panel regressions (4) were estimated by using the dynamic panel estimator method by Arellano and Bond (1991) Table 9 . They indicate that fragmentation and internalization positively impact all measures of liquidity, both globally across markets and locally in the primary market. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level except that of the fragmentation index in the regression of local quoted spreads.
Conclusion
The coming into force of MiFID in 2007 has fomented competition, complexity, and change in the trading industry across Europe. This study draws on high frequency data from the most active markets for FTSE-100, CAC-40, and SBF-120 stocks to show that the trading Results on internalization are more mitigated. Contrary to Degryse et al. (2011) , I found that internalization could positively impact depth, but that it could be harmful for quoted spreads. Those effects, however, are not significant for all indices and are not robust to the methodology employed. global quoted spreads and average local quoted spreads for the primary market and the four leading MTFs, by month and by sample. Part B reports average global effective spreads and average local effective spreads for the primary market and the four leading MTFs, by month and by sample. Effective spread statistics are based on a reduced universe comprising transactions exchanged in on-book continuous trading. The third column shows the volatility of daily returns on the index during the month. The fourth column is the capitalization-weighted average volatility of daily returns for the stocks in the sample. ***,**,* means that the difference between the average in consideration and that of October 2007 is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively. global depth and average local depth for the primary market and the four main MTFs, by month and by sample, expressed in thousands of euros. Quantities taken into account are disclosed quantities at best limits. The last column is the average trade size in thousand euros. ***,**,* means that the difference between the average in consideration and that of October 2007 is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively. Note: This table reports (Panel B) liquidity measures on fragmentation and internalization. Variables used in the regressions are monthly observations per stock for 140 non-financial equities (51 FTSE-100 components, 32 CAC-40 components, and 57 SBF-120-specific components) over the three post-MiFID months of January, June, and September 2009. Internalization is measured by the share of trading volume reported by Markit-BOAT and the LSE reporting service. The fragmentation variable is the value of the monthly fragmentation index per stock as predicted by a first-stage regression in which instrumental variables are the average trade size, the average number of markets quoting the stock, and the average percentage of markets quoting the best bid and ask prices and in which market value and volume serve as controls. Second-stage regressions control for volatility, market value, volume, and price level. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively. t-statistics are provided in brackets. was alternatively the average global quoted spread, the average global effective spread, the average global depth, the average local quoted spread, the average local effective spread, and the average local depth. The independent fragmentation measures were the fragmentation index and the internalization share. All regressions controlled for price range, volume, and price level. Panel A displays the estimates of two-way fixed-effects panel regression directly run on fragmentation measures. Panel B displays the estimates of second-stage two-fixed-effects panel regressions in which the fragmentation and the internalization variables were replaced by their values as predicted in first-stage regressions. Panel C displays the estimates of GMM dynamic panel regressions in which market value, volume, trade size, multi-market competition level, lagged fragmentation and a SBF-120 dummy serve as instruments. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively. P-values are provided in brackets. (Panel B) , and 56 SBF-120 stocks (Panel C) -over 63 trading days from 1 September to 30 November 2009. The dependent variable was alternatively the average global quoted spread, the average global effective spread, the average global depth, the average local quoted spread, the average local effective spread, and the average local depth. The independent fragmentation measures were the fragmentation index and the internalization share. All regressions controlled for price range, volume, and price level. The left part of the table ("One-stage panel regressions") displays the estimates of two-way fixed-effects panel regression directly run on fragmentation measures. The right part of the table ("2 nd stage panel regressions") displays the estimates of second-stage two-fixed-effects panel regressions in which the fragmentation and the internalization variables were replaced by their values as predicted in first-stage regressions. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively. P-values are provided in brackets. ), the internalization share (ITN it ), the daily price range ( it ), the market value in logarithm (lnMV i ), the daily euro traded volume in logarithm (lnV it ), price level (1/P it ), the logarithm of the average size in euro of all continuous trades (lnTS2 it ), the logarithm of the average size in euro of continuous trades internalized trades excluded (lnTS1 it ), and the level of competition between markets (MC it ). Means and standard deviations of those variables are also reported. Panel A displays the statistics established for FTSE-100 stocks, Panel B those for CAC-40 stocks, and Panel C those for SBF-120 stocks. The observation period covers 63 trading days from 1 September to 30 November 2009. ***,**,* indicate that correlation coefficients statistically differs from zero at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
